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In this paper we argue that sub-national public units do have a wide range of innovation policy 
related tools and thus the opportunity to conduct a proper and effective innovation policy, 
independently from superior policy levels. However, as the following example of Bavarian 
technology and innovation policy in the field of biotechnology discloses, several crucial 
particularities have to be taken into account. These are on the one hand organisational specifications 
of the promoted industry, on the other hand the connectivity to policy programmes on higher policy 
levels. To examine that kind of policy measures, the authors have applied a new biographical 
method on the firm level. In so doing we thoroughly examined knowledge and financial flows of 
biotechnology companies in the Munich area and were hence able to soundly qualify the impact of 
sub-national policy measures. As a consequence the authors were enabled to identify key 
institutional arrangements, as the focus on one specific location (clustering), the setting up of public 
support organizations as well as public Venture Capital (VC), and others. The surprising result of 
our survey: Munich firms benefited much more from sub-national policies than from any other 
policy level. 
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The ability of states to build up an innovative commercial industry, whether “clustered” or not 
is seen in the literature as considerably low (Meyer.Krahmer 1999; Hilpert 2001, 
Martin/Sunley 2003, Feldman/Francis 2003, Mayer-Schoenberger 2007). In recent times 
capability seems to be reduced even further by macro-developments as globalisation and 
Europeanization. However there are examples where a congruent and long lasting policy 
measure has well led to such a result. Namely the Munich Cluster for biotechnology which 
has developed without any historical predecessor as for instance the pharmaceutical industry. 
Even more surprisingly, it seems that this kind of process can be traced back not to national or 
supranational, but to specific sub-national policies.  
It is widely acknowledged that biotech industry relies on a wide range of surrounding 
institutional arrangements, which last form favourable regulation, availability of venture 
capital to excellence of publicly financed research organisations (Kaiser, 2003). Thus 
empirical studies in that sector have often applied a systemic approach, stemming originally 
from the National Innovation Systems literature.  
Systemic analytical concepts of innovation processes consider innovative actors, such as 
firms, universities and non-university research laboratories, as organizations that interact with 
each other under conditions set by an institutional environment in which these organizations 
are embedded (Braczyk et al. 1998; Cooke 2001; Dosi et al. 1988; Edquist 1997; Freeman 
1987, 1995; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1987, 1993; OECD 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Kaiser/Prange 
2004). Analyzing innovation processes under a systemic approach provides the advantage that 
differentiations in institutional, infrastructural or cultural conditions for innovation, which 
exist among countries, regions or sectors, become visible. These conditions determine the 
relationships among private industrial actors, public administrations and the science and 
education systems, as well as the forms and intensity of their interactions. 
Starting from its initial perspective on the “National Innovation System”, the approach has 
been diversified since the early 1990s by studies that recognized the evolution of autonomous 
systems of innovation at the local, the regional, the European and even the global level (e.g., 
Acs 2000; Braczyk et al. 1998; Cooke et al. 2000; Dalum et al. 1999; De la Mothe and Paquet 
1998; Howells 1999; Mytelka 2000). Whereas a first group of scholars stressed the importance of local institutions and networks, transfer mechanisms, regional labor markets, as 
well as specific socio-cultural environments a second group pointed to the internationalization 
of markets, technologies and corporate activities as well as the ongoing Europeanization of 
public policies. They both have in common that they called the dominance of national 
institutions into question as they emphasized the growing importance of institutional 
arrangements below and beyond the nation-state level. A third strand of the literature has 
almost dismissed a territorial perspective and has instead concentrated on sectoral innovation 
systems, thus pointing  to the fact that certain technologies have specific knowledge bases, 
actors, etc. (cf. Carlsson 1997; Malerba 2002). As our analytical focus is here on the local 
level, we assume that there is a partially autonomous sub-national innovation system and that 
there is a specific design of a sectoral institutional environment, in which the Munich biotech 
cluster is embedded.  
The application of a systemic approach towards innovation allows us to look closer on recent 
changes that have occurred within the triple helix of university-industry-government 
relationships which are certainly crucial for commercialization in science-based sectors. 
These relations, along with the internal transformations within each of the spheres of an 
innovation system, have been stresses especially by the so-called Triple Helix thesis 
(Leydesdorff/Etzkowitz 1996; Benner/Sandström 2000; Etzkowitz/Leydesdorff 2000; 
Leydesdorff 2000).  
The Regional Innovation System approach can be seen as complemented by the cluster and 
innovative milieux strand of literature. In this context, the literature on innovation, knowledge 
and regional agglomeration has placed some emphasis on local networks, inter-firm 
collaboration and regional knowledge spill-overs from, publicly-funded research institutions 
to spin-off firms, as a major source of regional competitive advantage and innovation 
(Breschi, Lissoni 2001). This point of view is anchored in the further increasing tendency of 
many industrial and service sectors to cluster in relatively few places around the world. The 
biotech industry is leading that tendency with an incontestable drive to concentrate in certain 
places. This trend seems to be accelerating, even if modern means of telecommunication as 
well as decreasing costs for travelling and transport support new forms of (virtual) proximity 
(Morgan 2004). As well as the systemic innovation strand of literature, the cluster approach 
has led to numerous empirical studies about necessary institutional arrangements and success 
factors for the development of a sustainable biotech Industry.  
  2Most of those studies rely on macro indicators, such as patent applications, means for research 
and venture capital-investments. We do not contest that such analysis yielded valuable results, 
but suggest a slightly different approach. By descending to the firm level, and looking close at 
salient events in firm history as well as usage of public support measures, we think of being 
capable to find some new insights into the interplay of institutional environment including 
innovations policies and firm development.   
Our approach to sketching a biotech firm’s innovation biography is based on the following 
principles: We capture the whole lifetime of the company, which is feasible in the case of 
Munich biotech firms given that most of which have a corporate history of less than 15 years. 
We assess all of the corporate activities and interrelations with extra-firm organizations and 
institutions. We start by mapping the respective innovation practices that are related to these 
corporate activities and go on to evaluate the interrelationship between these activities, Finally 
we identify and systematize the knowledge flows, financial flows and the organizational 
innovations that play a crucial role for the initiation and execution – as well as success or 
failure – of the firm’s innovation process. As a consequence we are able to qualify specific 
policy measures and their impact on the firms’ development and can thus rate those much 
more precisely than studies covering macro- and highly aggregated indicators. 
We applied our approach onto five Munich Biotech companies, which have beforehand 
revealed to be the most successful and stable ones in the region. All of those are public 
companies namely Medigene AG, Micromet AG, GPC Biotech AG, 4SC AG and Wilex AG. 
They account for the lion’s share of revenues and research expenditures in the Munich area, 
and even in Germany. 
 
 
II. The Munich Cluster 
 
Since the mid-1990s the Munich cluster for pharmaceutical biotechnology, which is mostly 
centered at the location of Großhadern/Martinsried, has emerged in a dynamic process of 
formation of new small and medium-sized research companies. The number of those 
companies has risen steadily from 32 in 1997 to about 100 in 2006. More than half of them 
(63) can be characterized as core biotechnology companies that are specialized in the 
development of therapeutical products (BioM 2004a). As a result, the Munich cluster gained a 
  3leading position among Germany’s biotech locations. This holds especially true in view of 
therapeutical drug candidates which are currently undergoing pre-clinical and clinical trials. 
Before approval drugs have to pass three clinical testing phases and thus a close look at the so 
called pipeline yields valuable insights about the future potential of a firm or a region. In 
2007, the number of drug candidates introduced in the development process by firms at the 
locations of Cologne, Heidelberg, Berlin and was between 4 and 13; Munich-based firms had 
35 (see fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 
Drug candidates of the leading Biotech 
















































Source: Liecke 2007, p.63
 
 
Public research organizations played an important role in this commercialization process. The 
most important actors in this respect, the Technical University, the University of Munich, the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Biochemistry and the Institute of the Society for Environment and 
Health (GSF) provided (and still provide) the knowledge-base for a number of academic spin-
offs. Between 1995 and 2000 alone, 30 of the 52 new established biotechnology companies 
were founded out of these organizations (Kaiser 2003, 849). Furthermore, the emergence of a 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, along with similar developments in other “new 
technology” industries, also motivated the establishment of various intermediary institutions 
  4which are aimed at supporting the creation of start-up companies by providing different 
resources and services. 
Since the year 2002, however, the number of new biotechnology company formations in the 
Munich area has been entering a phase of stagnation. Whereas in the period of 1997 to 2000 
about 17 new biotechnology firms were established per year, there were only about six annual 
start-up companies from 2000 - 2006 (BioM 2007). The Munich biotechnology cluster thus 
has clearly entered into a phase of consolidation in which growth exist mostly within the 
already established companies.  
 
III. History and self-conception of Bavarian innovation policy 
 
A close look at the past of Bavarian led industrial- and innovations-policies shows two unique 
underlying principles that revealed itself as key issues for later biotech-policies: the state 
induced concentration of innovation-related actors in a single agglomeration, -thus to 
strengthen the already strong locations-, and the willingness and capability to invest high 
amounts of money over long periods. This kind of government action is fed by a positive 
track record in earlier “future”-industries as for instance, defence, nuclear or microelectronics.  
Bavaria started off after WWII as a predominantly agricultural country. Some industrial cores 
existed though, mainly around the Munich, Nuremberg and Augsburg Area. In addition the 
country “benefited” from large relocation efforts especially of the aviation sector by the 
German war industry at the end of WWII into the allegedly safe south. In the following years 
the regional government, insisted on its constitutional right to autonomously conceive 
research and education frameworks and policies. By constructing large scale aviation-research 
facilities all clustered in the Munich area, many companies were incited to relocate their 
production and research units to the same location. A defence minister on the federal level, 
stemming originally from Bavaria supported that kind of industrial policies by providing 
generous contracts designated for the rebuilding of the federal army, to firms of that region. 
As a consequence and proof of Bavarian promotional success, two thirds of the whole 
German aviation and defence industry were concentrated within that cluster in 1970. 
(Trischler 2004, 146). 
In the early 1950s Bavaria discovered the field of nuclear technologies as a further “future” 
sector and undertook similar efforts to concentrate research and industry in the Munich era. 
  5High financial amounts were spent for a large scale research plant. Industrial partners were, as 
usual at that time, larger industrial companies, as for instance Siemens. The overall balance of 
those measures is ambivalent though. Indeed a high quality of research in the Munich area 
was obtained, but commercialisation in shares of workforce or industrial revenues stumbled. 
Reasons therefore are at least twofold, on the one hand other German Länder entered a strong 
competition in that sector, on the other nuclear industry revealed itself as a dead end, at least 
in Germany. Here public opposition grew onto one of the highest levels in any industrialized 
countries and thus the industry suffered soundly, especially from the 1980s on, from a lack of 
public orders. 
The 1970s with its focus on the promotion of the microelectronics industry were marked by a 
twofold change in Bavarian policies. First, the privileged region included, apart from Munich, 
from now on another town, Nuremberg, and the industrial partners were not exclusively large 
multinational companies but also small- and medium- sized enterprises. Also the building up 
of young and innovative companies, spun-off from publicly financed research organisations 
obtained direct public support for the first time. The Bavarian success in that technology field 
was, even more than nuclear technology before, challenged by technology programmes of 
other Länder. Especially Baden Württemberg comprising a large number of SME in related 
technology areas set up an ambitious programme.  
A positive side-effect of Bavarian industrial and technology policy in the past, was the 
establishment of a highly potential venture capital branch in the Munich region. The reasons 
therefore are twofold, firstly the regional policy efforts in aerospace/defence and 
microelectronics had led to a high number of young start-up companies which were attractive 
especially for VC-firms, and secondly; Bavaria  interpreted in the 1980s federal law 
concerning the taxation of VC-Portfolio Managers much more liberally than other German 
Länder and thus established a competitive and first mover advantage. Consequently the 




IV. Specific Bavarian Instruments promoting Biotech Innovation 
 
  6In the mid nineties the Bavarian Government decided to sell most of its stakes in publicly held 
companies and in so doing gained privatization revenues of all in all 4.2 billion Euro. Bavaria 
invested these means in several technology supporting programs, for the building up and 
strengthening of what was to be judged as key-industries. (for Bavarian innovation policy in 
the field of feature film production see Kaiser/Liecke 2007). A large part, some 500 M. Euro 
of that sum were channelled into the biotechnology sector, geographically concentrated into 
the Munich era. In so doing Bavaria developed several policy instruments to support both the 
research and commercial side of the industry. The most important impacts and developments 
are to be presented in the following. By applying our biographical method on the Munich 
firms mentioned in Section I, we found ourselves able to identify crucial policy measures for 
the firms’ development. As we have already stated before, they were predominantly 
conceived and executed on the regional level. In the following we show how those institutions 
exactly supported the set-up of the biotech cluster and asses their impact as well as their 
interplay. 
 
IV.1 Concentration and upgrade of public research 
Large parts of the privatization funds dedicated to the biotech-sector, were used to upgrade 
and concentrate publicly financed research organisations in the Munich area. In so doing 
several departments of the University of Munich, comprising those for pharmacy, chemistry 
and biology were relocated to a campus area in Martinsried near Munich. Currently the 
Bavarian Government has decided to build up a completely new biomedical centre, for some 
135 M. Euro. The expenses for all those measures were predominantly beard by the Bavarian 
state. Federal or European grants were touched, albeit not fundamental to the policy decisions. 
As a consequence today two universities, two university hospitals and three Max-Planck 
institutes are concentrated on the Martinsried-Campus. The latter are specialised in large-scale 
basic research, and are thus of great importance for the cluster itself, whether as a cooperation 
partner or as a source of spin-off firms. Most of today’s Biotech firms in the region are indeed 
spin-offs and so three out of our panel companies are. This supports the widely common 
argument that first class research is one of the most important pre-conditions for a successful 
cluster. In addition all of the firms we thoroughly examined, benefited from the local research 
base, whether through formal or informal R&D collaboration, or by the presence of a highly 
skilled labour force. 
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The pharmaceutical biotechnology sector mainly consists of young spin-offs or start-up firms, 
which are engaged in a highly complex, very long-lasting, capital intensive and uncertain 
R&D process. To succeed in overcoming those difficulties and bringing a product to the 
market, the emerging industry relies heavily on the availability of capital. 
Germany traditionally has a bank-centered financial system that is widely considered to favor 
established industries and thus disadvantage high-risk technologies that potentially create 
radical product innovations. In such a system corporate investments in VC seemed to be not 
very attractive, as they were taxed at a 56 per cent corporate tax rate, and no capital gains tax 
rates reduction could be achieved. Therefore, since the mid 1990s the German federal 
government aimed to modify the framework conditions for the provision of private VC, and in 
addition to install a complex and potent state owned system of VC risk sharing. In fact, the 
federal state established a public investment company (“Technologiebeteiligunggesellschaft”, 
tbg) which absorbed up to 80 per cent of the risk of VC-investments through guarantees, and 
facilitated those further through generous co-financing options. However, there were some 
requirements to receive tbg funding. The funded company was not allowed to have more than 
50 employees, annual turnover had to be less than five M. Euro, and a large company 
ownership had to be less than 25 per cent.  
The Bavarian Government supplement the federal measure through the up-setting of a state 
owned venture capitalist, BayernKapital, in 1995, providing financial aid to Bavarian start-up 
companies. “BayernKapital”, spent till today about 128 M. Euro exclusively for young 
Bavarian knowledge based firms (mainly in key-industries like: biotechnology, medical 
devices, environmental technology, information and communication technologies, and 
software). Subsequently the number of private VC-firms in the Munich area rose enormously 
to more than 40 in the year 2004, the highest concentration of VC in the whole of Germany. 
The importance of BayernKapital is underlined by the fact that no other German Land 
possesses a similar organization. All the examined successful firms in the cluster benefited 
from financial support of BayernKapital. For one of the companies it played an encouraging 
role to relocate their business from Berlin to Munich. 
BayernKapitals’ (BK) investment strategy relied on two principles: co-financing; means a 
private investor has to be engaged before BK turned active, and, interest was solely realized 
through a specifically German financial construction, the so called silent partnership. Both 
principles proofed to be well suited for company support in a surging market but turned 
  8problematic in a general decline. Co-financings have revealed as extremely pro cyclic, means 
if there is a lot of market coordinated private capital available, co-financings put something on 
top. But in the opposite case – declining markets, vigilant private investors- co-financings can 
hardly contribute anything to help companies over that shortfall. The tool of silent-partnership 
has proved to be problematic as well, as it is widely unknown by international investors and 
re-payment procedures were often not clearly codified. Since 2005 BayernKapital has 
readjusted its strategy and conducts investments only in market usual participatory forms.  
As a consequence of those two institutional shortages, public investments collapsed alongside 
private investments in the difficult years of 2002 and 2003, marked by the bursting new-
economy bubble. In fact, tbg and BayernKapital invested a total of 30 M. Euro into the 
Munich Biotech Cluster in the year 2000, but only 0.7 M. Euro in 2003 (BioM, 2004b see 
page 23). The drop out of state owned financing organizations was problematic, as they were 
supposed to invest mainly in the seed phase of startup or spin-off firms. Those early phases 
are often eschewed by private venture capitalists, since the costs of evaluation and monitoring 
make it more lucrative to engage in fewer but larger firms. (Adelberger 1999). Today the 
situation has slightly improved, due to a recovering VC-market, but not through adjusted 
responses of state owned organizations. 
 
IV.3 Strengthening project based research 
Already in 1990 the Bavarian government installed the “Bayerische Forschungsstiftung” 
(Bavarian Research Association, BRA) which was conceived to support application oriented 
research, mainly through collaborations between Bavarian research organizations and 
companies. The overall associational funds amount today to some 350 M. Euro, releasing 
annual research means of approximately 25 M. Euro in recent years. Objective of the 
association is thereby to support key industries and further advance already strong sectors, as 
amongst others medical technology, biotechnology, information and communication 
technologies. In so doing the BRA supports one of the underlying principles of Bavarian 
Innovation policies; invigorate the already strong. 
Four out five of our biotech panel firms took or take part in research projects financed by the 
BRA. However some specific formalities to assess BRA funding have turned that kind of 
research promotion partly into a blunt instrument. Commercialization of research results is 
often hindered by the associational requirement to publish results. Consequently intellectual 
property protection becomes, especially for young and small companies exceedingly difficult 
  9if not impossible. The consequence that follows is that small companies hesitate to engage in 
potentially fruitful research collaborations, as they “fear” to invent something, that can’t be 
patented afterwards. This shortfall is well known in the Bavarian administration but the status 
of the association as charitable organization blocks any kind of modification efforts.  
Another deficit of the BRA, at least from a small company point of view, is the extremely 
high requirement standards for eligibility, regarding report obligations, and financial 
conditions of participating firms. 
 
IV.4 Setting up an innovative networking organization 
A further leveraging factor for the Munich biotech development was the state initiated 
building up of an independent intermediate organisation in 1997. The so called BioM AG is 
responsible for intra- and inter- cluster partnering and networking. The organisation became a 
crucial actor in the regional innovation system, due to its endowment with both, public and 
private VC. The organisational form as a public company (Aktiengesellschaft AG) is unique 
in Germany and opens up a lot of room of manoeuvre to the executives. This allows them also 
to employ experts on a much higher salary level than public administration is usually 
permitted to offer. Consequently an internationally eminently respectable biotech researcher 
and founder could be attracted for the CEO position.  
Apart from “normal” network tasks, such as consulting and partnering, the organisation 
features - unique in Germany- a (small) seed-capital fund which holds investments of some 11 
M. Euro. Over a 10 year period, 1997 – 2007 the BioM AG has invested seed funds in 
approximately 40 start-up companies, predominantly in the Munich area (own research). In 
the beginning the BioM AG was strictly focussed on the provision of seed-capital, means to 
establish a company. In later cluster development stages however the BioM started to act as a 
reliever for more mature firms that faced financial difficulties.  
The ability to invest autonomously VC into start-ups, lifted the status of the network-
organisation clearly as it turned from a more consulting and representing institution into an 
active player closely informed about current shortfalls in and problems of biotech start-ups. 
The close relation to the Bavarian government in turn, established a tight and catalysed 
connection between government and companies. In addition the BioM is closely linked to the 
BayernKapital and usually assigns capital seeking companies to it.  
  10The BioM AG has always been with priority by the Bavarian Government, as an interview 
partner mentioned “The CEO of the BioM AG just has to call the ministry of economics, and 
he gets at once an appointment with the Minister of economic affairs”. However in recent 
years BioM started to engage itself on a national and even European level. In so doing it 
initiated alongside with other German biotech cluster a working party of Bioregions on the 
national level. The working party in turn influenced successfully some national biotech 
related promotion-programs. In addition the BioM AG was crucially involved in the 
foundation of an independent national association BIODeutschland in 2004, which has 
developed to the official organ of the German biotech companies. 
Especially in the beginning of the commercialisation stage of the Munich cluster BioM AG 
played an additional important role by massively representing the location on national and 
international fair-trades. The visibility of the cluster was in so doing strengthened. This has to 
be seen in the context, that other German Bioregions never had the means and financial funds 
to act comparatively. The central importance of the BioM AG regarding its multitude of 
functions is thus highlighted by all of the examined panel-companies.  
 
IV.5 Establishing a highly subsidized biotech incubator 
Also by financial means of privatisation revenues, a specific biotech incubator on the campus 
Martinsried was initiated by the Bavarian Government in 1995. About 25 M Euro were 
directly invested, a further 22 M leveraged. This constitutes, compared to other highly 
ambitious incubators as for instance the “Heidelberg Technologiepark”, a considerably high 
level of subsidisation. As a result the Munich incubator is able to charge comparatively low 
rents, and is working at full capacity since its construction. Remarkable as well is the fact that 
some of its earnings are also used for the support of start-ups, means that the incubator 
acquired interest in firms, although on a very low financial level. Three out of the five most 
successful Munich biotech firms were attended within that incubator. 
As many Bio-clusters possess incubators, the one in Martinsried can hardly be seen as a 
source of competitive advantage. However it constitutes a necessary key component for a 
functioning cluster.  
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The Munich Business Plan Competition (MBPC) is another important component in the 
regional innovation system respectively the regional innovation policies. It was initiated 1996 
by the Free State of Bavaria and the management consultation McKinsey after the model of 
the MIT in Boston and is financially supported until today by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. According to the organiser of the competition around 480 new enterprises happened 
to be built-up and financed in the last 10 years, often possessing an emphasis within the field 
of technology. More than 3,250 new jobs could so be created. The competition is thereby 
benefiting from the high entrepreneurial potential of the region, the large number of 
promoters and supporters as well as the operational numerous VC-companies. The latter 
invested until today approximately some 265 M. Euro in founders or young enterprises. 
(MBPW 2008a). A majority of the laureates stem from the area Life Sciences. Since 1997, 
some 39 larger prices were awarded, which of 12 can be assigned directly to the 
biotechnology, some further to the medical technology (own research). The competition 
receives its particular regional-specific importance, as it focuses specifically on founders from 
the Munch region. In addition similar successfully equivalents in other German Länder are 
missing. Besides of the concrete impact on the formation of biotechnology companies, the 
competition has proofed to be a useful vehicle for the establishment of a positive 
entrepreneurship climate in the Munich region. The competition was promoted from the 
beginning by the Bavarian state government. In the last years some 400.000 Euro annually 
were spent. 
 
IV.7 Internalize favourable initiatives on the federal level: 
In 1996 the German ministry of Research and Education launched a competition, which is 
today widely seen as initial jump-start for the German biotech sector as a whole (Dohse, 
2000). Briefly summarised the competition addressed regions, to present their existing 
infrastructure for biotechnological research and commercialisation, as well as their potentials 
to build up on those. In detail the competition assessed a multitude of factors, as: 
•  number of already existing biotech companies and research units 
•  existing networks among different biotech Research facilities 
•  number and quality of supporting agencies, as: patent offices, consultancies and 
information networks 
  12•  potential sources for finance, whether bank centred or private equity 
•  specific competence of local/regional public authorities 
•  density of collaboration between regional research units and hospitals 
The winning regions were picked by an independent jury, consisting of researchers, and 
industrial and labour union representatives. They finally elected the Munich region, the 
Rhineland region (a consortium of cities by Cologne, Aachen, Dusseldorf and Wuppertal), 
and the so called Rhine-Neckar Triangle (established by the cities of Heidelberg, Mannheim 
and Ludwigshafen). Those three winners received an one-time financial assignment of 25 M 
Euro each, and in addition privileged access to the federal support program 
Biotechnology2000. “The political intention behind this strategy was to further strengthen 
already strong and established locations.”(Kaiser 2003, 846). 
The Munich candidature was conceived by the „Initiativkreis Biotechnologie“, a predecessor 
of the BioM AG. In so doing the “Initiativkreis” received far ranging financial and personal 
support by the Bavarian government. A further important factor regarding the Munich 
candidature was the inauguration of a key-person, who had short time before co-founded a 
biotech firm, as central node in the uplifting network. That extensive support by the Bavarian 
government to push the Munich region in the competition is not self-evident, as the other 
winning regions had to rely solely on private initiatives. 
The Bavarian Government perceived the winning of the competition as a signal to further 
allocate financial means to the cluster of Martinsried in the following years and thus apply 
consequently their principle of further invigorating an already strong region. This indicates a 
fundamental difference to other German Länder, as for instance Baden-Wurttemberg with its 
promising and also winning location of Heidelberg, drew a completely different consequence. 
There the government decided after the competition to further support other Baden-
Wurttemberg biotech locations to establish an element of  regional compensation. 
 
 
V. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
Our research on the most prominent biotech firms resulted in the insight that all of them have 
benefited from Bavarian support policy, more than from any other political level. The 
  13differing kinds of support can be concluded as follows, collaboration with a comparably 
highly effective network organisation, usage of state VC, incubation in a science park, 
collaboration with proximate research organisations. The following table briefly summarises 




Table 1: Bavarian policies and its benefiting firms 
 
Specific Bavarian policies  Benefiting Panel-Firms 
Strengthening Research Base  Medigene AG, Wilex AG, Micromet AG 
Businessplan Competition  Wilex AG 
Incubation  Wilex AG, Micromet AG, 4SC AG 
Strengthening project based 
research 
Medigene AG, GPC AG, Wilex AG 
Bavarian Public VC  Medigene AG, Wilex AG, Micromet AG, GPC AG, 4SC AG 
Networking through BioM  Medigene AG, Wilex AG, Micromet AG, GPC AG, 4SC AG 
Source: own research 
 
By implementing those policies the government covered the whole biotech specific 
innovation process, from public financed research, where most of the young innovative 
companies spin-off over the specifically high needs of VC, to enduring partnering activities 
by regional network organisation. 





  14Table 2: Federal policies and its benefiting firms  
 
Specific Federal policies  Benefiting Panel-Firms 
Public VC  Medigene AG, Wilex AG, Micromet AG, GPC AG, 4SC AG 
BioRegio Contest  GPC AG, Wilex AG, Micromet AG,  
Means for Project research  GPC AG, Medigene AG, 4SC AG 
Source: own research 
 
In this contribution we argued in contrast to wide parts of the literature that sub-national 
innovation policy, merely on its own, was capable to crucially promote a world leading 
biotechnology cluster in the Munich area. As a result we can clearly highlight the role of 
regional innovation systems (Cooke 2001) as decisive in innovation-processes. Also the role 
of clusters and localised knowledge spill-overs is of high importance and not overestimated as 
recent publications (Morgan 2004) suggest.  In fact only three significant measures were 
drawn up on a higher political level: the BioRegio contest, public VC-initiatives by the tbg on 
the federal level, and the introduction of less restrictive regulation in the early nineties 
induced by the European level.   
Bavarian biotech-innovation policy was marked by the need for stamina over a particular long 
period of time and by a multitude of concrete policy measures. Some of them were innovative 
and crucial some rather complementary to policy programmes on a higher policy level. In so 
doing the Bavarian government has applied a systemic innovation concept, improving the 
institutional endowment of biotechnology firms regarding public research, education, VC and 
(partially) regulation.  
However we are well aware that German Länder still possess a high level of competences, 
especially in the field of research and education, which other regions especially in Europe 
lack. Thus the empirical finding we presented can hardly serve as best-practice example for 
less favoured regions in terms of legislative freedom, but might indicate that in fact the region 
as responsible unit is more suited to implement long-lasting and effective innovation policies 
than other levels of political action, due to its proximity to all relevant actors. Less favoured 
regional units are thus reliant or even dependent on fitting policy actions on higher levels. 
This kind of obedience is even aggravated as the European level, is more and more dismissing 
its earlier position to strengthen regional capabilities. 
  15Our finding poses a few further research questions. For instance; why were other German sub-
national units not willing or able to copy Bavarian strategies?  In so asking especially the case 
of Heidelberg in Baden Wurttemberg becomes a puzzle, as there preconditions regarding the 
quality of local biotech research and education at least equalled if not excelled the conditions 
in Munich. One answer lies probably in the polity of Bavaria, comprising a strong centralistic 
element which favours the capital region for public investments and initiatives. Another one 
lies in the fact that the country is governed over a fifty-year period by one party that believes 
in the positive outcomes of conductive policy measures. As the biotech sector has proved to 
be one, that needs a dense institutional network and a multitude of public measures, starting 
from the support of public research organisations, incubation, and favourable environment for 
venture capitalists, just to name the important ones, one can conclude that a sector with its 
need for mentoring and an interventionist policy tradition, have fruitfully met. However given 
the fact that in the United States public policy support is extraordinary strong especially for 
emerging clusters, such as North Carolina or Maryland, a further aggravation of framework 
conditions or a reduction of public policy efforts could seriously harm the further 
development of the Munich cluster. 
From an economic point of view the Bavarian engagement yielded ambivalent results. In deed 
Bavarian state lead measures nearly established a leading European location for biotech 
research and commercialisation. But the amounts invested did not (yet) have any strong 
impact regarding new jobs, firms-revenues or tax-revenues. The years to come will proof 
whether regional firms are able to finish their development projects and bring self developed 
medical treatments on the market. So far no German biotech has managed to do so. 
The success and partial shortfalls of Bavarian innovation policy -especially in the financial 
sector and the institutional design of the Bavarian Research organisation - gives us sound 
references, to draw several generalized policy recommendations: 
 
•  Public innovation policies are in need to apply a systemic view on innovation 
processes. Non-systemic public innovation policies are like to create unintended 
negative externalities. A systemic view also provides for a clear understanding 
whether a “best practice” solution established in another country is likely to have the 
same positive effects in other institutional environments.  
 
  16•  Intermediary organizations that are set-up by public actors need a considerable 
freedom of operation. As we have shown by the example of the BioM AG, cluster 
management organisations are potentially capable to develop a high degree of pro-
activity and dynamics if they have executive freedom and a generous endowment. In 
fact they are very close to the firms’ needs and current developments and are suited to 
act as a catalyser to the relevant government ministry. 
 
•  Public innovation policies that aim to initiate or foster private engagement are in 
need of a specific exit strategy which foresees both cyclic and deviant behaviour 
of private actors. As the case of public VC-investment has shown, public activities 
both at the national and the regional level were not designed in a way that allowed 
either for a constant engagement in early stage investments nor for stabilizing start-up 
companies in critical times. 
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